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State of Utah, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) OPINION 
) (Not For Publication) 
v. ) 
Kerry Ross Boren, ) Case No. 890326-CA 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank C. Noel 
Attorneys: Connie L. Mower, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Bullock.1 
BULLOCK, Judge: 
Kerry Ross Boren appeals the denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 
Boren was charged in 19B3 with the second-degree murder of 
his wife. The information charging him was amended to include 
not only a charge for intentional second-degree murder under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) and (b) (Supp. 1983), but also for 
second degree murder "acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life* as provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (Supp. 1983). At his arraignment, Boren 
waived a formal reading of the amended information and pleaded 
not guilty. 
Some time after Boren's arraignment, his counsel discovered 
that the original information against him had been amended to 
include a charge under the "depraved indifference* subsection of 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1)(j) (1987). 
the statute defining second-degree murder. Boren and his counsel 
discussed the possibility of a plea bargain, and Boren reportedly 
refused to plead guilty to knowing or intentional murder. 
Boren's counsel, however, called his attention to the possibility 
of pleading guilty to charges under the "depraved indifference" 
subsection of the statute. 
On April 16, 1984, Boren appeared with his counsel before the 
district court, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding, and changed to 
guilty his plea to the charge of second-degree murder. In the 
ensuing colloquy, the principal focus was on the "depraved 
indifference" subsection: 
The Court: Your name is Kerry R. Boren, and 
I believe you are charged with murder in the 
second degree. 
Ms. Carter [Boren's counsel]: Your honor, 
perhaps I could help the court. He is 
pleading under the depraved indifference 
section and not under either the "a" or "b" 
subsections. 
The Court: Is that agreeable with the state? 
Mr. Gunnarson [for the State]: Yes, your 
honor. 
The Court: By entering a plea of guilty, 
you do, in fact, admit the facts that 
support that charge. Do you understand 
that? That means the depraved indifference 
to human life. 
Mr. Boren: Yes, your honor. 
Boren then indicated, among other things, that he was 
literate in the English language, was without mental impairment, 
and that he understood his constitutional rights and the fact 
that he was waiving them by pleading guilty. The court pointed 
out potential sentences that could be imposed for the crime to 
which Boren was pleading, and then continued: 
The Court: Mr. Boren, to the charge of 
criminal homicide, murder in the second 
degree, a first-degree felony, as I have 
explained it to you, which occurred at 34 
East Miller Avenue in Ealt Lake County, 
state of Utah, on or about September 15, 
1983, in violation of title 76, chapter 6, 
section 203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, in that you, Kerry R. Boren . . . 
caused the death of Elvia Boren—while 
acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life—engaged 
in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby caused the 
death of Elvia Boren. What now is your 
plea, guilty or not guilty? 
Mr. Boren: Guilty, your honor. 
The Court: Plea of guilty is received, and 
the court finds that it was freely and 
voluntarily made by the defendant, that he 
is not presently under the influence of any 
drugs, narcotics, or alcoholic beverages, 
nor has a physical or mental disability as 
such that interferes with his free choice to 
enter such a plea. I base those findings on 
my observations of the defendant here in the 
courtroom, together with the questions that 
were put to him and his responses thereto. 
At the hearing, Boren also signed an affidavit acknowledging 
his plea of guilty. The affidavit recited the elements of the 
offense as "acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, Defendant engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the 
death of another.* The affidavit stated the facts as "I created 
a grave risk of death to my wife which resulted in her death by 
my lack of appropriate treatment and care." 
In July of 1987, Boren moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
After an evidentiary hearing and review of the transcript of the 
hearing at which the plea was entered, the district court denied 
the motion. Boren appeals, arguing that his guilty plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, or in conformity with Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e).2 
The entry of the guilty plea in this case occurred before the 
decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), which we 
do not apply retroactively. State v. Hickman. 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 
14 (Utah 1989); State v. Vasilacooulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988). We therefore review Boren's motion to withdraw his plea 
to determine whether, based on the record as a whole, the plea 
was entered with full knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights that Boren thereby waived. Brooks 
v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985); Warner v. florris, 709 P.2d 
309 (Utah 1985); £££ also Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 
18 (Utah 1989). 
Boren argues that it was not clear from the original 
proceedings that his plea of guilty was based exclusively on the 
depraved indifference portion of the second-degree murder 
statute, subsection 76-5-203(1)(c), and that his guilty plea was 
not based on a sufficient understanding of the elements of the 
crime as explained in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044-49 
(Utah 1984) and its progeny. As indicated above, however, the 
principal focus of the hearing at which Boren's guilty plea was 
accepted was the depraved indifference subsection, and Boren's 
affidavit clearly states the elements of depraved indifference 
murder. Based on our review of the record as a whole, we cannot 
conclude that Boren lacked adequate understanding of 
second-degree murder with depraved indifference, or that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying Boren*s motion to 
withdraw his plea. 
2. In a supplementary brief filed with this court, Boren also 
questions other procedures employed in the original proceedings 
against him. However, these arguments are not timely raised 
before this court, and do not appear to have been considered by 
the trial court. We therefore do not address them. Jolivet v. 
Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep 17, 19 (Utah 1989). 
The denial of Boren's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty 
is therefore affirmed. 
J. Robert Bui lock. Judge 
k ^ 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
, 0 " ./*- C — ?A' 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
KERRY ROSS BOREN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870480 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant and counsel for defendant have filed separate 
briefs on appeal to this Court. In response, the State will 
first address the issues raised by defense counsel and then the 
issues raised by defendant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a denial of defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw a Guilty Plea to Murder in the Second Degree, a first-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
1983), in the Third Judicial District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i)(Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea finding that defendant did not 
show "good cause" for withdrawal? 
2. Whether defendant is precluded from raising 
collateral issues on appeal from a denial of his Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-ll(e)(Supp. 1988)i 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has 
made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements: 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) i 
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may 
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Kerry Ross Boren, was charged with Murder in 
the Second Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1983). Defendant pled guilty to 
subparagraph (c) of Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree 
felony, on April 16, 1984, in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Banks on May 17, 
1984, to a term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 15, 1983, defendant called a 911 telephone 
operator to report that his wife, Eliva Boren, was having 
difficulty breathing (R. 12). Robert Staley, a Salt Lake City 
detective, responded to the call and upon arriving at defendant's 
residence discovered Eliva in a crouched position in the bedroom. 
Id. Multiple bruises covered her entire body and she appeared to 
be dead. Id. 
Medical examination of Eliva confirmed her death and 
revealed that the cause of death was "blunt force trauma" and 
could not have been self-inflicted. Ld. Medical examination also 
concluded that the cause of death, a probable beating, occurred 
on or before September 10, 1983 and September 13, 1983, at least 
two days prior to defendant's 911 call. Id. 
Holly Bollschweile, age 26, and Karen Boren, age 9, 
were residing at defendant's home at the time of the victim's 
death. Id. Both of them stated that on or dbout September 13, 
1983, defendant entered the victim's bedroom and locked the 
bedroom door. Ld. They heard sounds of defendant beating the 
victim, ^d. They also stated that they had heard defendant 
beating the victim on prior occasions. Id. 
On September 19, 1983, defendant was arrested and 
charged with subsections (a) and (b) of Murder in the Second 
Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-203(1)(a) and (b)(Supp. 1983) (R. 11). The information 
alleged that defendant "intentionally or knowingly caused the 
death" of the victim, or in the alternative, that defendant 
"intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, committed 
an act clearly dangerous to human life and caused the death" of 
the victim. Id. 
At a preliminary hearing on January 6, 1984, the State 
amended the Information to add subsection (c) of Second Degree 
Murder alleging that defendant, "acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another." (R. 4, 
13) (See Addendum "A"; Amended Information). Defendant waived a 
formal reading of the Amended Information (R. 4). The State 
presented five witnesses and introduced two exhibits into 
evidence (R. 5-6). One of the exhibits introduced was a medical 
report diagramming the injuries sustained by the victim (R. 4) 
(See Addendum "B"; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2). The report 
described the injuries as "many contusions about the face, chest 
and [right] knee and leg." Id. Defendant was present during the 
presentation of the State's case (R. 4). Based upon the evidence 
adduced, Judge Robert C. Gibson bound defendant over to the 
district court for trial (R. 4). 
Defendant was arraigned in the district court on 
January 13, 1984, and given a copy of the amended information 
R. 14). He entered a plea of "not guilty" to the Murder charge. 
Id. Upon motion of defendant, the Court ordered a psychiatric 
evaluation (R. 18). 
On April 16, 1984, defendant entered a change of plea 
to the Murder charge (R. 50). At the changte of plea hearing, the 
Amended Information was read to defendant and he entered a plea 
of "guilty" to Second Degree Murder under subsection (c), the 
depraved indifference subsection (R. 133, p. 5) (See Addendum 
"C"; Plea Hearing Transcript). Judge Jay E. Banks sentenced 
defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 69-70). Defendant did not appeal his conviction and 
sentence. 
On July 28, 1987, more than three years after defendant 
entered his guilty plea, defendant filed a pro se Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea (R. 76-79). After a hearing on October 
28, 1987, where defendant and his former defense counsel 
testified, Judge Frank G. Noel denied the motion (R. 104). Judge 
Noel found that defendant knew he was pleading to Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, and did so knowingly and voluntarily 
(R. 117). He further found that defense counsel explained to 
defendant and defendant understood the definition of "depraved 
indifference," the subsection of Second Degree Murder under which 
defendant pled guilty (R. 115). Defendant ftow appeals the denial 
of his motion. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT^  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
that defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing where 
defendant was present during the preliminary hearing, a copy of 
the information was read to defendant, and defendant acknowledged 
his willingness to enter a voluntary guilty plea both orally and 
in writing by admitting the elements of the offense after 
consulting with his attorney. Furthermore, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant's alleged 
misunderstanding of the elements of the offense charged; namely, 
that he knew he was creating a grave risk of death to another. 
The record as a whole clearly establishes that this element was 
explained to defendant and that defendant understood the mens rea 
for the offense charged. 
The remaining issues raised by defendant are collateral 
and beyond the proper scope of review for a Motion to Withdraw a 
Guilty Plea. A defendant should not be permitted to raise issues 
unrelated to the validity of his guilty plea particularly where 
defendant could and should have raised such issues on direct 
appeal. Thus, this Court should not consider the merits of 
defendant's remaining claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA. 
Defendant claims that Judge Frank Noel abused his 
discretion in denying his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
Since Points I, II, III, IV, V and VI of appellate counsel's 
brief focuses on the same issue, the state addresses all of these 
points in Point I of this brief in response. 
Defendant claims that the record below establishes that his 
guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because Judge Banks 
failed to strictly adhere to the procedures for taking guilty 
pleas outlined in Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-
11(e) (Supp. 1988), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
Specifically, defendant claims that he was not informed of each 
element of the offense charged and that the court did not 
determine whether defendant understood the nature of the charges. 
Defendant concludes that the trial court's alleged failure 
renders his guilty plea invalid. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) provides that a plea of 
guilty may be withdrawn as follows: 
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may 
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
A plea of guilty or not contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of court. 
Id. Accordingly, a criminal defendant may not withdraw a guilty 
plea as a matter of right, but only upon a Showing of "good 
cause." State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); 
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978). Mere technical errors 
in the acceptance of an otherwise knowing and voluntary guilty 
plea do not automatically invalidate a guilty plea. State v. 
Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah 1986). Rather a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the trial court's 
discretion. State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977); 
State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). As in all 
discretionary matters afforded the trial judge's perogatives as 
well as his advantaged position, reviewing courts accord 
considerable latitude to the trial judge's discretion and will 
not interfere "unless it plainly appears that there was abuse 
thereof." Forsyth, 560 P.2d at 339 (footnote omitted). 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United 
States Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for a 
trial court to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative 
showing in the record that it was made intelligently and 
voluntarily. In Boykin, the petitioner pled guilty to five 
indictments charging common law robbery and was sentenced to 
death. The judge asked rio questions of the defendant concerning 
his plea, and the defendant did not address the court. The high 
court stated: 
Several federal constitutional rights are 
involved in a waiver that takes place when a 
plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal 
trial. First, is the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the 
States by reason of the Fourteenth. . . . 
Second, is the right to trial by jury. . . . 
Third, is the right to confront one's 
accusers. . . . We cannot presume a waiver 
of these three important federal rights from 
a silent record. 
Id. at 243 (citations and footnote omitted). As a result of 
Boykin, minimum requirements were established which a court must 
meet when a defendant enters a guilty plea. 
In two decisions subsequent to Boykin, the Court 
further clarified the relationship between a knowingly and 
voluntarily entered plea and the defendant's constitutional 
rights. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Court, citing 
Boykin/ upheld guilty pleas as voluntarily and intelligently made 
without any indication that a strict recitation of the Boykin 
trilogy of constitutional rights was required to be made at the 
time of the acceptance of the pleas. In clarifying Boykin, the 
Court stated: 
The new element added in Boykin was the 
requirement that the record must 
affirmatively disclose that a defendant who 
pleaded guilty entered his plea 
understandingly and voluntarily. 
Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-48, fn. 4. The Brady court looked to the 
issue of voluntariness and intelligence of the person taking the 
plea without tying its analysis to the strictures of the Boykin 
litany. The Court considered all relevant circumstances 
surrounding the guilty plea in order to determine its 
voluntariness. 
Likewise, in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970), the determination of whether a plea was made voluntarily 
and intelligently did not rest upon the structured questions of 
the Boykin litany, but rather upon the determination of "whether 
the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Alford, 
400 U.S. at 31. 
In addition to the minimum requirements enumerated in 
Boykin, criminal guilty pleas in Utah are governed by Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e) (Supp. 1988), which 
provides as follows: 
(3) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest and shall not accept such a pea until the court has 
made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements: 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
In conducting a Rule 11(e) review of this case, the less-rigid 
2 
Warner-Brooks standard should be applied. Warner v. Morris, 709 
P.2d 309 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985). 
See also State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986). Under 
Warner-Brooks, the "record as a whole" standard is applied by the 
appellate court to determine whether the defendant entered his 
plea with full knowledge and understanding of the offense of 
which he had been charged, its elements, and the nature of the 
sentence he may receive. 
In Warner & Brooks, the trial court failed to ask 
specifically if "he [defendant] was aware that he had a right 
2 
In the case at bar, defendant entered his guilty plea on 
April 16, 1984. Because defendant's plea was entered prior to 
this Court's 1987 decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), this Court should find that Gibbons should not be 
applied retroactively. See State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 
(Utah App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
against compulsory self-incrimination" Warner, 709 P.2d at 310. 
Despite the trial court's failure to address the issue, this 
Court stated "that the record as a whole affirmatively 
established that defendant entered his plea with full knowledge 
and understanding of its consequences." ^d. at 310. 
In Miller, the defendant argued the trial court abused 
its discretion by refusing to allow him to yithdraw his guilty 
plea since he did not understand the nature of the charges 
against him or the consequences of his plea. Miller, 718 P.2d at 
405. This Court found that although the trial court did not make 
a specific finding to this effect, "the absence of a finding 
under this section is not critical so long as the record as a 
whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant entered his 
plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences 
and of the rights he was waiving." Id. 
Miller, Warner and Brooks indicate that a trial court 
accepting a guilty plea is not constitutionally required to do 
all that Rule 11(e) lists. Constitutionally, all that is 
required is that the overall record discloses that the defendant 
voluntarily and intelligently entered his guilty plea. 
In addition, other courts have differed as to how 
strictly the Boykin standard must be followed in guilty plea 
proceedings. A majority of courts have held that as a matter of 
constitutional due process, a defendant's constitutional rights 
to a jury trial, confrontation, and protection against self-
incrimination need not be specifically and expressly articulated 
by the trial judge and expressly waived by the accused prior to 
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the acceptance of the guilty plea. See e.g., Rouse v. Foster, 
672 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Neely v. Duckworth, 473 
F.Supp. 288 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761 
(9th Cir. 1974); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913, 915-16 (10th 
Cir. 1973); McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101, 1106-10 (5th 
Cir. 1973) cert, denied 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Wood v. Morris, 87 
Wash. 2d 501, 554 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1976); State v. Laurino, 106 
Ariz. 586, 480 P.2d 342, 344 (1971). 
The constitutional requirements of Rule 11(e) and 
Boykin were met in the instant case as shown by a review of the 
record. At the April 16, 1984, guilty plea hearing, Judge Banks 
questioned defendant to determine whether defendant's guilty plea 
was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (R. 133, P. 2-
6) (Addendum "C"; Plea Hearing Transcript). The court commenced 
its inquiry by stating the crime charged: "Murder in the Second 
Degree." I_d- a t 2. Defense counsel added that defendant was 
pleading guilty under subsection (c), the depraved indifference 
subsection of Second Degree Murder, and not under either 
subsection (a) or (b). Ij3. Defense counsel explained that the 
plea bargain agreement included the State's promise to not file 
any charges concerning defendant's alleged sexual relations with 
a child and also to request the Uintah County prosecutor to not 
proceed on a car theft diversion case which diversion would be 
violated by defendant's guilty plea. Id. 
When defendant was questioned if there had been any 
promises made to induce his guilty plea other than previously 
stated in court, defendant answered in the negative. Ijd. at 2-3. 
Defendant also denied the existence of any promises as to the 
sentence which may be imposed by the court and denied any threat, 
duress, or that any other undue influence was exerted on him to 
enter a guilty plea. JEd. at 3. 
Defendant, openly admitted the facts supporting the 
charge. Ld. Specifically, defendant acknowledged that he 
understood that he was admitting that his actions demonstrated a 
"depraved indifference to human life." Jki. He further 
acknowledged that he was 42 years old and could read and write 
the English language. Id. 
The Court then asked defendant whether he was under the 
influence of any drugs, narcotics, or alcoholic beverages or 
whether he had any physical or mental disability that would 
interfere with his ability to freely enter a guilty plea. 
Defendant responded in the negative. Id. 
The Court asked defendant if he had reviewed his 
constitutional rights as set forth in the plea affidavit. (R. 50-
51, 133 at p.4). (See Addendum "DH; Plea Affidavit). The plea 
affidavit, signed by defendant, fully explains the underlying 
facts of the charge, the elements and nature of the offense 
charged, the maximum sentence which may be imposed, and the full 
array of constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea 
(R. 50-51). Defendant indicated that he had reviewed his 
constitutional rights and understood the rights he was waiving 
(R. 133, p. 4). Defendant was afforded an opportunity to 
question the court about the waiver of his constitutional rights, 
which he declined Ici. Defendant expressly waived all of his 
constitutional rights, both state and federal, and executed the 
affidavit. Icl. He acknowledged to the Court that he understood 
the sentence for the crime is five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison and that in all probability he would be so 
committed. Id. 
The Court then asked defendant how he pled to criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, 
occurring at 34 East Miller Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about September 15, 1983, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953, as amended), in that defendant, while 
acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby caused the death of Eliva Boren. Id. 
at 5. Defendant responded "guilty." Icl. The Court entered a 
finding that defendant's guilty plea was "freely and voluntarily 
made. " :rd. at 5. 
Regardless of these facts, defendant asserts that his 
guilty plea was improperly entered because neither the judge nor 
the plea affidavit explicitly stated the appropriate mens rea for 
the depraved indifference murder charge. He claims that he did 
not understand the nature and elements of the charge. 
Recently, this Court in State v. Standiford, 98 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 43 (Sup. Ct. December 30, 1988), clarified the culpable 
mental state for depraved indifference murder under Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-203(1)(c)(Supp. 1988).3 Under Standiford, a "jury 
3 
Subsequent to defendant's guilty plea, the Second Degree 
Murder statute was amended in 1986. 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 157, § 1. 
However, the amendment is insignificant to the analysis of the 
should be instructed that to convict of depraved murder it must 
find (1) that the defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a 
grave risk of death, (3) that the defendant knew the risk of 
death was grave, (4) which means a highly likely probability of 
death, and (5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness 
and indifference toward human life," Standiford at 48. 
Defendant alleges a misunderstanding of the first two 
elements of depraved indifference murder, i.e. that he acted 
knowingly in creating a grave risk of death. To commit depraved 
murder, a defendant need not knowingly cause the death of 
another, but "only consciously engage in such conduct, even 
though not intending the resulting death." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 1986). Thus, the knowing element for 
depraved indifference murder is less than what is required for an 
intentional or knowing murder. Standiford at 48. 
In the case at bar, defendant acknowledged consciously 
engaging in conduct that created a grave risk of death to the 
victim (R. 133, p. 3). He further acknowledged the facts 
supporting the charge which alleged that the victim died as a 
result of a severe beating (R. 133, p. 4; R. 12). After beating 
his wife, defendant again knowingly engaged in conduct that 
created a grave risk of death by failing to secure adequate 
medical attention for her. 2£*« The medical reports concluded 
that the cause of death, a probable beating, occurred on or 
between September 10, 1983 and September 13, 1983. ^ d. Two days 
Cont. present case. 
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later, on September 15, 1983, defendant called the 911 operator 
and reported that his wife was having difficulty breathing. Id. 
Moreover, defendant testified at the evidentiary 
hearing below that his mental state at the time of his wife's 
death was that he "was ignoring her, and her needs, and her 
problems." (R. 134, p. 19). After severely beating his wife, 
defendant admitted that he consciously ignored the medical needs 
of his wife. Id. 
The Plea Affidavit, signed by defendant, also 
establishes that defendant understood he was admitting knowing 
conduct in regards to his wife's death (R. 50; Addendum "D"; Plea 
Affidavit). The facts portion of the affidavit reads, "I created 
a grave risk of death to my wife which resulted in her death by 
my lack of appropriate treatment and care." Jd* From this clear 
language, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant understood 
he knowingly engaged in conduct that resulted in his wife's 
death. 
The testimony of defendant's former defense counsel 
also establishes that the defendant understood the knowing 
element of the depraved indifference murder charge. At the 
evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that she conferred 
with defendant personally before he entered his guilty plea (R. 
134, p. 53, 64-65). She testified that she explained to 
defendant the definition of "depraved indifference" and what it 
meant as opposed to intentionally and knowingly causing another's 
death. Ld. at 58. She also testified that she was satisfied that 
defendant understood the difference between the two charges. Id. 
Defendant admitted that defense counsel had in fact explained and 
defined depraved indifference murder to him prior to the plea. 
Id. at 31. 
Based upon this evidence, Judge Ndel found that defense 
counsel explained to defendant and defendant understood the 
definition of "depraved indifference," the subsection of Second 
Degree Murder under which defendant pled guilty (R. 115 )(See 
Addendum "E"; Findings and Conclusions). He further found that 
defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered (R. 117) 
Addendum "E" ) . 
Overwhelmingly, the record as a whole establishes that 
defendant clearly received "'real notice of the true nature of 
the charge against him.'" Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 
(1976) quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). 
Furthermore, based upon the preliminary hearing evidence, the 
plea affidavit, the plea hearing transcript, the testimony of 
defense counsel, and the testimony of defendant, the record 
clearly establishes that defendant understood "the elements of 
the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the facts." 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). Thus, Judge 
Noel did not abuse his discretion in finding that defendant's 
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING ISSUES ON 
APPEAL COLLATERAL TO HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
Defendant raises several claims in addition to his 
attack on his guilty plea. Specifically, appellate counsel 
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claims defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at 
the plea hearing. Additionally, defendant in his pro se 
supplemental brief claims a Miranda violation during a pretrial 
custodial interrogation and a denial of access to personally 
review his pre-sentence report. These claims are procedurally 
barred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) permits a criminal 
defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea upon a showing of 
"good cause." The purpose is to permit a defendant to "undo a 
plea which was unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily 
made." State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987) 
(footnote omitted.) As noted by this Court in State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987), there is no statutory time limit 
for filing a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea. However, the 
limited statutory privilege to move to withdraw a guilty plea 
does not include a right to raise issues collateral to the 
withdrawal motion. 
Similar to the reasoning in cases involving collateral 
attack by habeas corpus, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
should not be used to perform the same function as regular 
appellate review. Cf. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 
(Utah 1983). If a motion to withdraw is denied by the trial 
court, a "defendant could them appeal-not from the conviction per 
se but from the denial of the motion." Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 
341 (Utah App. 1988) citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311-12 (Utah 1987). The statutory privilege to appeal a denial 
of a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea must be narrowly limited to 
whether the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. A 
general attack on a conviction should not be permitted. Were it 
otherwise, "the regular rules of appellate procedure governing 
appeals and the limitations of time specified therein would be 
rendered impotent." Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 
968, 969 (1968). 
In the present case, defendant's ineffective 
assistance, Miranda, and pre-sentence report claims could and 
should have been raised on direct appeal Accordingly, defendant 
should be considered procedurally barred from raising collateral 
issues in a postconviction Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea. Cf. 
Codianna, at 1104. 
In any event, the Miranda and pre-sentence report 
claims are not relevant to the validity of defendant's guilty 
plea and should be considered beyond the scope of review. While 
the ineffective assistance claim may be argued to have some 
relation to the validity of the plea, a full Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) reh'g denied 467 U.S. 1267 (1984) 
analysis is unwarranted. Rather, the focus must be on whether 
defendant's plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entered, not whether defendant's trial attorney was effective at 
the plea hearing. Cf. Gallegos at 1041. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
DATED th is f (— day of April, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
08/03/41 
Issued by; E. Neal Gunnarson 
BAIL: $150,000.00 
VS. 
KERRY R. BOREN 
Judge 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 83 FS 2371 
Defendant(s). 
(Address/DOB) 
/^//& 5 <*!"/// 
The undersigned frofrort l i t any - South 
under oath s t a t e s on information and be l i e t 
committed trie crimes of: 
{/ 
S.L.P.D. 
that the detendant(s) 
0 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, SECOND DEGREE, a First Degree Felony, 
Miller Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State ot 
about September 15, 1983, in violation ot Title 
5, section 203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
> amended, in that the defendant, KERRY R. BOREN, a party to 
x *K^ « ^ ^ ^ " intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
or intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life 
that caused the death, ot Elvia Boren, or acting under 
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human 
late, engaged in conduct whicn created a grave risk of death 
to another, and thereby caused the death of Elvia Boren; 
^ 
at 34 East 
Utah, onor 
76, Chapter 
the offense, 
Elvia boren, 
^ r 
This information is based 
on evidence obtained trom 
the following witnesses: 
lant 
Subscribed and sworn to me 
this z£? day of January 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ooooi 
ADDENDUM B 
INJURY SYMBOLS 
IDENTIFYING MARK? 
Q N - Scar 
( T ) - Tarn, 
( C ^ Defprr r . . t> 
GUNSHOT WOUNDS 
• ••" * 
Shotgun Pellets 
( j \ ) s Entrance 
x^rj - Ex -. t 
SHARP INSTRUMENT WOUNDS 
(ED=Stab 
( j = Incise • cut -slash 
Q mj = Puncturefneedle, na>', »ce pick) 
B 
L 
U 
NN 
T
 J 
F U 
OR; 
RY 
C 
E 
C I ~^ ^racturt' h-r^' 
Q x Q - Lacerabr I K 
1
 F ra f - i ' . j ' k - »- "dli'a:-
&~ c " 
BODY DIAGRAM 
f - R O M A N D BACK V l l V, PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
NO. > - , A 
VICTIMS HT.. 
in inches 
SCALE 
LOCATE EACH INJURY BY GIVING DISTANCE FROM TOP OF HEAD AND RIGHT OR LEFT OF MIDLINE 
Location * 3 ^ 6*s + /u,Ue<> ^ g e o t t c x s n \ R e p o r t e d £ k > 0 _ 
AOd'ess or L o c a t i o n K o ^ n f l T i m e 
Q ' - v ? : ^ 
Dd:e 
Body Body 
U f J l C Ttme Q k ^ Temp U fC HL Time L > A / X L Temp. U J f t f l M Time C ' ? O Q Heat Loss UKIC* 
2 Hour interval 
n of Body > ^ p t f J * c ( fc H £ M F i e J , R,9m Present? AJc t ocat.on fcc/uC, 
Neck, T r u n k , Arms, Legs 
. T i m e j ^ & -
^ K L fciiMfiE.k/»bte JLio' ir i . f-vj Color r n r j c l c: 6 i * C * . » ffioe ^ j / u v r ^ s Time Q 7 Q Q Fixed? fli ?*><-» 
Locat ion 
' Ufijk'/UCUL'*'' 
Last Seen Death 
T.mp QAJ/c D a t e J ^ i A . Ahve O Q 3 o Qatp ^ ^ ^ Noticed C ^ ^ Date 2 > l l l L J 
T ime ~ Time 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAY E. BANKS 
--OO0OO--
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
KERRY ROSS BOREN, 
DEFENDANT. 
E^MBD 
CASE NO. CR-8<4-<+0 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
TAKEN AT: METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE; SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH NEAL GUNNARSON 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: MS. LINDA CARTER 
LEGAL DEFENDERS' ASSOCIATION 
DATE: APRIL 16, 1981+ 
Robyn Haynlc 
Haynle U Solder 
817 Lake Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 531-6116 
FILED 
EM 88 L 
Oer*. Supcame O/jrt ? nvi 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, APRIL 16, 1987 
2 9:30 A.M. 
3| --OO0OO--
4 
5 1 THE COURT: KERRY ROSS BOREN. 
6\ MS. CARTER: LINDA CARTER APPEARING ON HIS 
7 BEHALF. YOUR HONOR, THE PLEA BARGAIN THAT HAS BEEN 
8 I ACCEPTED BY MR. BOREN IS HE WILL REENTER A PLEA AS CHARGED 
9 IN THIS CASE, AND THE STATE HAS AGREED THAT THEY WILL NOT 
10 FILE ANY CHARGES CONCERNING ALLEGED SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH A 
11 CHILD. 
12 THE PROSECUTOR HAS ALSO AGREED THAT WE WILL 
13 CALL THE PROSECUTOR IN UINTAH COUNTY AND ASK THEM NOT TO 
14 PROCEED ON A CAR THEFT DIVERSION CASE THERE WHERE THIS PLEA 
15 WOULD CLEARLY VIOLATE THE DIVERSION, AND THAT'S THE EXTENT 
16 OF THE PLEA BARGAIN. 
17 MR. GUNNARSON: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
18 THE COURT: YOUR NAME IS KERRY R. BOREN, AND I 
19 BELIEVE YOU ARE CHARGED WITH MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
20 MS. CARTER: YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS I COULD HELP 
21 THE COURT. HE IS PLEADING UNDER THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
22 SECTION AND NOT UNDER EITHER THE "A" OR "B" SUBSECTIONS. 
23 THE COURT: IS THAT AGREEABLE WITH THE STATE? 
24 MR. GUNNARSON: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
25 I THE COURT: OTHER THAN WHAT HAS BEEN STATED 
1 
1 HERE IN COURT, MR. BOREN, HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE 
2 TO YOU TO INDUCE YOU TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY? 
3 MR. BOREN: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
4 I THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY THREATS, DURESS 
5 OR ANY OTHER UNDUE INFLUENCE EXERTED ON YOU TO ENTER SUCH A 
6 PLEA? 
7 MR. BOREN: NO, SIR. 
8 I THE COURT: BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU 
9 DO, IN FACT, ADMIT THE FACTS THAT SUPPORT THAT CHARGE. DO 
10 YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? THAT MEANS THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
11 TO HUMAN LIFE. 
12 MR. BOREN: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
13 THE COURT: HOW OLD ARE YOU? 
14 MR. BOREN: 42. 
15 THE COURT: DO YOU READ AND WRITE THE ENGLISH 
16 LANGUAGE? 
17 MR. BOREN: YES, SIR. 
18 THE COURT: ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE 
19 INFLUENCE OF ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? 
20 MR. BOREN: NO, SIR. 
21 THE COURT: DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE A MENTAL 
22 OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH YOUR 
23 FREE CHOICE TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY? 
24 MR. BOREN: NO, SIR. 
25 THE COURT: HAVE YOU GONE OVER THE AFFIDAVIT 
»• 
THAT SETS FORTH YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS? 
MR. BOREN: YES, I HAVE. 
THE COURT: DO YOU UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS? 
MR. BOREN: YES, I DO. 
THE COURT: ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS YOU WOULD 
CARE TO ASK THE COURT WITH REFERENCE TO THOSE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS? 
MR. BOREN: NO, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T. 
THE COURT: BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU DO 
WAIVE ALL OF THOSE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY 
STATE OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
THAT? 
MR. BOREN: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: HAVE HIM EXECUTE THE AFFIDAVIT. 
(MR. BOREN EXECUTES THE 
AFFIDAVIT.) 
THE COURT: THE SENTENCE FOR THIS CHARGE IS FIVE 
YEARS TO LIFE IN THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY. YOU UNDER-
STAND THAT? 
MR. BOREN: YES, I DO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE TO 
YOU AS TO WHAT THE COURT MAY DO AS TO SENTENCE IN THIS CASE? 
MR. BOREN: NO, SIR, THERE HASN'T. 
THE COURT: I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN ALL 
PROBABILITY YOU WILL BE COMMITTED TO THE STATE PENITENTIARY. 
1 YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
2 MR. BOREN: YES, SIR. 
3 I THE COURT: THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A COMPELLING 
4 REASON WHY I WOULD NOT COMMIT YOU TO THE STATE PENITENTIARY 
5 UNDER SUCH A CHARGE. HIS FORMER PLEA OF NOT GUILTY IS SET 
6| ASIDE. 
7 MR. BOREN, TO THE CHARGE OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, 
8 MURDER IN THE SECOND-DEGREE, A FIRST-DEGREE FELONY, AS I 
9 HAVE EXPLAINED IT TO YOU, WHICH OCCURRED AT 3k EAST MILLER 
10 AVENUE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON OR ABOUT 
11 SEPTEMBER 15, 1983, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 6, 
12 SECTION 203, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THAT 
13 YOU, KERRY R. BOREN -- WAIT A MINUTE. I HAVE GOT TO GET 
14 THE AMENDED INFORMATION. CAUSED THE DEATH OF ELVIA BOREN --
15 WHILE ACTING UNDER. CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING A DEPRAVED 
16 INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE -- ENGAGED IN CONDUCT WHICH 
17 CREATED A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO ANOTHER AND THEREBY CAUSED 
18 THE DEATH OF ELVIA BOREN. 
19 WHAT NOW IS YOUR PLEA, GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY? 
20 MR. BOREN: GUILTY, YOUR HONOR. 
21 THE COURT: PLEA OF GUILTY IS RECEIVED, AND THE 
22 COURT FINDS THAT IT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE BY THE 
23 DEFENDANT, THAT HE IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
24 ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, NOR HAS A 
25 PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH 
1 HIS FREE CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA. 
2 I BASE THOSE FINDINGS ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE 
3I DEFENDANT HERE IN THE COURTROOM, TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS] 
4I THAT WERE PUT TO HIM AND HIS RESPONSES THERETO 
5 YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED IN NOT LESS 
6 1 THAN TWO NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS. WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE? 
7 MS. CARTER: WE WOULD ASK FOR A PRESENTENCE 
8 REPORT, YOUR HONOR. 
9 THE COURT: THE MATTER WILL BE REFERRED TO THE 
10 ADULT PAROLE AND PROBATION DEPARTMENT FOR A PRESENTENCE 
11 REPORT, AND MY CLERK WILL HAVE AN AGENT CONTACT YOU IN THE 
12 JAIL. 
13 HAVE YOU SPENT MOST OF YOUR LIFE HERE IN UTAH? 
14 MR. BOREN: YES, SIR 
15 THE COURT: THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO HAVE IT DONE 
16 1 BY THE 4TH. SENTENCING WILL BE SET FOR MAY THE 4TH AT 
17 9:30 A.M. 
18 I MS. CARTER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
7 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, ROBYN HAYNIE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
FOREGOING PAGES 2 THROUGH 6, INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A FULL, 
TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE REQUESTED PORTION OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS HAD UPON THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER ON APRIL 16, 198<+, AND THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS 
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, ALL OF THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL AND 
RULINGS OF THE COURT, AND ALL MATTERS TO WHICH THE SAME 
RELATE. 
DATED THIS \\*> DAY OF C ^ ^ y . t - 1987. 
ROBYN HAYNIE, tSR/RPR 
ADDENDUM D 
! „ t h e E ^ l ^ r l C t C o « r « « f t l . . T h i r d J o l l e l - . O U . r l c , 
State of Utah APR 1G 1984 
T H E STATE O F U T A H . 
P t a M W , l (
 ( t Deputy C:er 
) Affidavit of Defendant 
Kerry P.. Boron \
 Crimtnal No 8^-^0 
Defendant / 
I. K e r r y R . B o r e n
 m under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
guilts to the charge(s) of 
Crlrr.1 na 1 Hemic 1 Je 
(Name of Crime) 
Hements Facts: 
AJ*:nr: under circumstances I created a grave rir-k cf 
••vl :e:;:in.^  a dcrraved Indifference death to my wife which 
human life. Defendant resulted In her death ly 
•:.;-,;Vji In cprJuot which created mv lack of arrropriate 
a "v-'^ r*sk o° d^ath to .mother treatment and care. 
a:;j thereby caused the death of another. 
I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
First Degree* Felony 
(Degree of Felony or Class ot Misdemeanor) 
and underhand the punishment for this enmemay be t o ± 1 . *J 
<£ i p p ,'\ n 
prison term. v x J i ^ J u line, or both I am not on drugs or alcohol 
n ' Mv piea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made 1 am represented by Attorney „ _ L i n u a r, • 
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them 
1 I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guiltv and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea ol guilty, or to a trial by a judge should 1 desircj 
2 I know that if I wish to have a trial I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court m mv 
presence and before the Judge and lurv * i th the right to have those witnesses cross examined by mv attornev I jKo 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testilv in court upon my behalt and 
that I could testily on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me 
* I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and everv element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that ol guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors 
4 | know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against my sell and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that i have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testily unless I choose 
to do so 
5 I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or bv the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah lor review ol the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me 
6 I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
prececdmg paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered 
7 | also know that if 1 am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have h<r«Q 
convicted or to which J have pk^d guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentcnccjJMng 
5* 
* f k n o w thai lN« fmct l ha l I hav« mrttmrmtt m B I M of fpjllty <flo<am oo« mmmr* thai the Jwdgt wtl l not «rr»p»>»c e i ih t f » r<oo 
Or sentence of i m p r u o n m c n i upon mc and no p r o m i M i have been made to mc by anyone a* to what the sentence wi l l 
he 
9 No promises or threats o( any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me. to-wit (Court case number(s) or count(s)) 
The State will not file any charges arising rrom alleged sexual 
relations with a chili. 
will he dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are nou known to the prosecuting attorney I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the Slate, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge 
10 I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read tome by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents I 
am k2 vears of age. have attended school through the * ~ ^ S - ^ C\K*- f^~g - an<* I can read and 
understand the English language ^ 
Hated this ?-4 dav of 19 7V 
Vjbxcnbed jnu sworn to before me in Court this 
£JL±^ 
Detendant 
tfay of W .. \9. 
^ 
Judge 
( E R T 1 H C A T E OF D E F E N S E A T T O R N E Y : 
I vertitv that I am the attornev tor K ^ r r y R , B o r ^ n l n c defendant named above and I know he 
has read rhe Affidavit, or that I have read it to him. and I discussed it with him and believe he lullv understands the 
meaning ot its contents and is mentally and physically competent Tothe best of m> knowledgeand belief thestatcments. 
representjtions and declarations made b> the defendant in the foregoing All idav it are in all respects accurate and true 
Pclense Attorney 
( F R T 1 H C A T E O F P R O S E C U T I N G A T T O R N E Y : 
I certify that I am the attorney tor the State of Ttah in its case against K e r r y R . t ^ r e n defendant 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the detendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the detendant There is reasonable cause to 
beiiese the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the piea 
would serve the public interest / * / / / 
{ < Prosecuting Auorncv 
O R D E R 
Based upon the facts set lorth in the loregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
euiltv is treelv and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set lorth in the 
-\tfida\it be accepted and entered - 7 * 
Done m Court this / jr dav of ^ ^ \ i.S . Is) ^ 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
b I c,er* 
4. f • 
District Judge 
ADDENDUM E 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
JAN 4 1988 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KERRY ROSS BOREN, 
Defendant. 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. CR 84-40 
Honorable FRANK G. NOEL 
The above entitled matter came regularly before the 
Honorable Frank Noel, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 28th day of October, 
1987 to consider the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
After having received testimony and reviewing the transcripts of 
prior proceedings concerning the initial entry of plea by the 
Defendant, the court hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant entered his guilty plea to Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, before the Honorable Jay Banks on 
April 16, 1984. 
oooil4 
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2. That prior to entry of plea the Defendant conferred 
personally with his defense counsel, Ms. Linda Carter. 
3. That prior to entry of plea Ms. Carter adequately 
explained to the Defendant all constitutional rights the Defendant 
would waive by entry of plea of guilty. 
4. That Ms. Carter explained to the Defendant and the 
Defendant understood the definition of "depraved indifference", 
the subsection of Murder in the Second Degree under which the 
Defendant plead guilty. 
5. That Ms. Carter explained to the Defendant the 
contents of the affidavit signed by the Defendant prior to entry 
of plea and further the Defendant understood the contents of said 
affidavit and voluntarily signed the same before the Honorable 
Judge Jay Banks. 
6. That the affidavit signed by the Defendant indicated 
the charge to which the Defendant was pleading guilty was Criminal 
Homicide. 
7. That the elements outlined in the Affidavit 
constitute Murder in the Second Degree. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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8. That at this time the Defendant admits that he 
admitted the acts alleged in the affidavit under Elements and 
Facts. 
9. That at the time of entry of plea, Ms. Carter 
informed the court while in the Defendant's presence that the plea 
would be "as charged in this case", Murder in the Second Degree. 
10. That the following statement was made by Judge Banks 
during the Defendant's plea of guilty: 
Mr. Boren, to the charge of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony, 
as I have explained it to you, which occurred at 34 
East Miller Avenue in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about September 15, 1983, in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that you, Kerry R. 
Boren - - wait a minute. I have got to get the 
Amended Information. Caused the death of Elvia 
Boren - - while acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life -
- engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby caused the death of 
Elvia Boren. 
That while asking the Defendant his plea, Judge Banks 
picked up the Amended Information from which he continued to read; 
this did not negate the initial part of the above quoted paragraph 
which indicated the statutory provision of the crime to which the 
Defendant plead. 
nUOV'* 
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11. That the requirements of State v. Gibbons, 60 UAR 
36, P2d (June 30, 1987) were fully complied with. 
12. That the Defendant knew he was pleading to Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree and did so knowingly and voluntarily. 
From the above Findings of Fact, the court now enters the 
followi ng : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. After being fully informed of all of his 
constitutional rights and after being fully informed of the 
charges against him, the Defendant freely, voluntarily and 
knowingly entered his plea of guilty to Homicide, Murder in the 
Second Degree. 
2. That all requirements of State v. Gibbons, 60 UAR 
P2d (June 30, 1987) were fully met at the time the 36, d £ ;
Defendant entered his plea. * 4 J^Uv^ 
-s •# 
FRANK G. NOEL, JUDGE 
Wheref ore/.TttJ&CBJfendant f $ motion to withdraw h i s g u i l t y 
p lea i s d e n i e d . ^,rfc 
D»pw»iy Cmrt 
Approved as to form: 
b^f 
efense Counsel 
oooU8 
